We develop a model of remedy offers made to an expert agency which has powers to act before any harm is experienced and is required to decide on the basis of tangible evidence. The model provides a relationship between the factors determining the probability of delay and the type of error in...

Despite intense price competition firms obfuscate product information when it is relatively costless to reveal, contrary to neoclassical predictions. This paper considers whether firms can profitably conceal (part of) their prices for a homogeneous product when consumers differ in their ability...

This paper shows how separately itemised surcharges potentially facilitate collusion during a temporary marginal cost shock if firms commit to their duration. A duopoly model with price matching punishments shows that if firms set higher prices they only receive punishment during the shock...

Introduction -- General analysis of hub-and-spoke collusion -- Collusion to raise downstream prices : upstream supplier as hub -- Collusion to raise downstream prices : downstream intermediary as hub -- Collusion to exclude rival firms -- General assessment of hub-and-spoke cartels --...

EU competition law prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. An example of abuse is the charging of unfair prices. This prohibition in Article 102TFEU has been used to sanction excessive prices that are ‘too high’. According to the ECJ in United Brands, a price is abusive if (i) the...

We analyse an experiment that observes each subject’s behaviour for both roles in the ultimatum and dictator game, and two modified ultimatum games where in the event of a decline the proposer and responder receive a λ- and (1-λ)-share of their proposed payoffs, respectively, where in our...