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In a variety of settings, budgets are set by a committee that interacts repeatedly over many budget cycles. To capture this, we study a model of repeated multilateral bargaining by a budget committee. Our focus is on the transition of agenda setting power from one cycle to the next, and how such...
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In models of dynamic multilateral bargaining, the literature tends to focus on stationary subgame perfect or stationary Markov perfect equilibria, which restrict attention to forward-looking, history-independent strategies. Evidence supporting such refinements come from environments in which...
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We experimentally study unanimity and majority voting rules in multilateral bargaining environments with stochastic future surplus. In these settings, reaching agreement when expected future surplus is sufficiently higher than the current surplus is inefficient. Theoretically, such...
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One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to - and do - engage in sometimes...
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In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects’ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a...
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