A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases. First,...

We compare the following multi-stage inter-dealer trading mechanisms: a one-shot uniform-price auction, a sequence of unit auctions (sequential auctions), and a limit-order book. With uninformative customer orders, sequential auctions are revenue-preferred because winning dealers in earlier...

During the 1990s, globalization and time‐based competition have emerged as important business strategies leading to renewed emphasis on the logistics function. This has opened up opportunities for strategic alliances between manufacturing firms and specialized logistics services providers,...

Two activists with correlated private positions in a firm's stock, trade sequentially before simultaneously exerting effort that determines the firm's value. We document the existence of a novel linear equilibrium in which an activist's trades have positive sensitivity to her block size, but...

We build a model of the financial sector to explain why adverse asset shocks in good economic timeslead to a sudden drying up of liquidity. Financial firms raise short-term debt in order to finance assetpurchases. When asset fundamentals worsen, debt induces firms to risk-shift; this limits...