We study how firms choose their debt maturity structure. We argue that because of lower information-gathering costs, institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with bonds outstanding across multiple maturities. We show that, in segmented markets, this preference for firms with bonds of...

This paper studies one of the potential causes of the financial market bubble of the late 1990s: herding behavior of mutual funds. We show that the incentives contained in the mutual funds' advisory contracts induce managers to overcome their tendency to herd. We argue that investing in bubble...

This article studies one of the potential causes of the financial market bubble of the late 1990s: the herding behavior of mutual funds. We show that the incentives contained in the mutual funds' advisory contracts induce managers to overcome their tendency to herd. We argue that investing in...

We study whether firms tend to make the compensation of their managers dependent on the relative level of valuation. We consider compensation in the sample period between 1992 and 2003 and show that an increase in company valuation leads to an increase in the pay-for-performance sensitivity....

We study the trade-off between liquidity and monitoring implicit in the bank-firm relationship. By virtue of their lending activity, banks have privileged access to inside information about the companies and their monitoring role helps them mitigate the managers' risk-taking behavior. However,...