A kooperatív játékelmélet egyik legjelentősebb eredménye, hogy számos konfliktushelyzetben stabil megoldást nyújt. Ez azonban csak statikus és determinisztikus környezetben alkalmazható jól. Most megmutatjuk a mag egy olyan kiterjesztését - a gyenge szekvenciális magot -, amely...

We examine assignment games, wherematched pairs of firms and workers create some monetary value to distribute among themselves and the agents aim to maximize their payoff. In the majority of this literature, externalities - in the sense that a pair’s value depends on the pairing of the others...

Sokan hajlamosak vagyunk a halogatásra. A homo oeconomicus viszont racionális. Ebben a cikkben azt tanulmányozzuk, hogyan modellezhető az a – klasszikus közgazdasági értelmezés szerint irracionális – magatartás, amely a vizsgált egyének nem standard időpreferenciáival...

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at...

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular...

We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as the solution concept for such games.We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for...

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular...

We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. we allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of...

Jelen tanulmányban megmutatjuk, hogy a tőkepiaci eszközök árazási modellje (CAPM) levezethető egy háromidőszakos általános egyensúlyelméleti modellből is, ami felveti a CAPM hosszútávú alkalmazhatóságát is. Bebizonyítjuk továbba, hogy a modellünk Pareto hatékony...