Standard methods for calculating cartel-damages rely on data of prices charged and quantity sold. Such data may not easily be available. In this paper, it is shown that a lower bound for cartel-damages can also be computed from accounting data. In previous literature it is shown that economic...

In many cases, collusive agreements are formed by asymmetric firms and include only a subset of the firms active in the cartelized industry. This paper endogenizes the process of cartel formation in a numeric simulation model where firms differ in marginal costs and production technologies. The...

The model proposed in this paper explains three stylized facts derived from case evidence: Cartel formation is more likely (i) when the industry has been hit by a negative profitability shock under the condition that (ii) this shock is rather persistent. (iii) This pattern is independent from...

Ende Juni 2013 hat die Europäische Kommission Leitlinien für Regionalbeihilfen für den Zeitraum 2014 bis 2020 verabschiedet. Der Autor argumentiert, dass diese Leitlinien stellenweise weder mit der ökonomischen Theorie noch mit verwandten Leitlinien und Mitteilungen der Kommission in...

This article provides a model of two risk-neutral firms that may cooperate to achieve a goal that is potentially illegal. The model assumes enforcement risk and firms that are imperfectly informed about antitrust law enforcement. It is shown that compliance training, which educates the agents...

Regression methods are commonly used in competition lawsuits for, e.g., determining overcharges in pricefixing cases. Technical evaluations of these methods' pros and cons are not necessarily intuitive. Appraisals that are based on case studies are descriptive but need not be universally valid....

This article provides a framework for the analysis of cartel formation. It models the strategic interaction among firms who invest into production capacity, sell a near-homogeneous good, and are subject to unexpected demand shocks with persistence. The firms either compete or collude in prices....

This article provides a theoretical model analyzing wholesale pricing tariffs set by a monopolistic manufacturer for its branded product that is sold to final customers by a monopolistic retailer. The bargaining power of the downstream retailer is strengthened by offering also a vertically...