This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting is simple. A key aspect of the mechanism is the use of at- will contracts which provide the...

In this paper, we resolve the auditor independence problem that arises in the model studied in Antle (1982, 1984). We argue that the owner-manager-auditor relationship exhibits a "separability" that facilitates the use of a particularly simple mechanism that prevents collusion. The mechanism...

In this paper, limited managerial capacity gives rise to a timing option: agents can implement projects now-or-later. Because each agent cares only about the project he implements, while the principal cares about the projects undertaken in aggregate, the timing option may be valued differently...

The push for increased transparency in financial reporting and corporate governance serves shareholders only up to a limit. The problem of assessing the value of transparency to shareholders is subtle because both the level and pattern of earnings can convey information. Even when earnings...

Aggregation is commonly associated with loss of information. In contrast, this paper shows that aggregation can actually enhance information down-the-road by deterring information cascades. In particular, when hierarchical tiers forward only aggregate recommendations rather than nitty-gritty...

BL Distinguished editors and contributors BL Addresses questions of some urgency for the question of women's quality of life BL Inter-disciplinary, ranging over philosophy, economics, political science, anthropology, law and sociology BL Combines theory with case-studies BL Accessible to...

A criticism of mechanism design theory is that the optimal mechanism designed for one environment can produce drastically different actions, outcomes, and payoffs in a second, even slightly different, environment. In this sense, the theoretically optimal mechanisms usually studied are not...

This paper presents an adverse selection model in which progressive taxation enhances productive efficiency by encouraging a principal (buyer) to be less aggressive in contracting with an agent (seller). Wary of padded cost budgets, the buyer employs a hurdle-rate procurement policy. With a low...