A simple version of the Demand Commitment Game is shown to implement the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any n-person characteristic function game. This improves upon previous models devoted to this implementation problem in terms of one or more of the...

This paper extends the work by Morris and Shin (1998) where multiple equilibria in the self-fulfilling currency attack models can be reduced to a unique equilibrium when agents observe fundamentals privately with small errors. We find that under a more general specification with realistic...

This paper extends the work by Morris and Shin (1998) where multiple equilibria in the self-fulfilling currency attack models can be reduced to a unique equilibrium when agents observe fundamentals privately with small errors. We find that under a more general specification with realistic...

Three issues in the political economy of protection are examined. The first, the endogenization of interest group formation, is addressed from the perspective of profitability instead of the difficulty caused by the free rider problem. The second issue is the determinants of an interest group's...

One most conspicuous and curious phenomenon in online auctions is that a large fraction of goods sold have posted price clauses whereby bidders can buy the goods without taking part in the auctions. Two types of posted price clauses exemplified by Amazon and eBay are found. The paper first...

This paper reexamines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels. It obtains some results which contradict findings by Grossman, Hart and Moore. In particular, it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may...

We study a model of centralized admissions in which schools are allowed to pre-commit to admitting qualified applicants who rank them as their top choices over more qualified applicants who do not. A less popular school may use the pre-commitment to steal applicants who otherwise would not...

This paper presents a model in which countries form economic unions which each determine common commercial policy and coordinate public good investment which generate cross-country externalities for its members. The scenario that all countries integrate into unions of the same size is studied....

A common concern about political decision making is that re-election concerns compel incumbent politicians to select policies that, although popular among the electorate, are inferior to available, less popular alternatives. Through studying a series of models, I find that, as long as...