In this paper we consider the nonparametric identification of Markov dynamic games models in which each firm has its own unobserved state variable, which is persistent over time. This class of models includes most models in the Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Pakes and McGuire (1994) framework. We...

We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which accommodates auction-specific unobserved heterogeneity and bidder asymmetries, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement...

We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which allows for one-dimensional auctionspecific unobserved heterogeneity, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement error in...

In this paper, we consider nonparametric identification and estimation of first-price auction models when N*, the number of potential bidders, is unknown to the researcher, but observed by bidders. Exploiting results from the recent econometric literature on models with misclassification error,...

We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when bidders’ private valuations are independent conditional on one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. We extend the existing literature (Li and Vuong, 1998; Krasnokutskaya, 2011) by allowing the unobserved heterogeneity...

We consider the identification of a Markov process {Wt,Xt∗} when only {Wt} is observed. In structural dynamic models, Wt includes the choice variables and observed state variables of an optimizing agent, while Xt∗ denotes time-varying serially correlated unobserved state variables (or...

We consider the identification of a Markov process {Wt,Xt*} for t = 1, 2, ... , T when only {Wt} for t = 1, 2, ... , T is observed. In structural dynamic models, Wt denotes the sequence of choice variables and observed state variables of an optimizing agent, while Xt* denotes the sequence of...

In this paper, we consider nonparametric identification and estimation of first-price auction models when N*, the number of potential bidders, is unknown to the researcher, but observed by bidders. Exploiting results from the recent econometric literature on models with misclassification error,...

<p>We consider the identification of a Markov process {W_t, X_t*} for t=1,2,...,T when only {W_t} for t=1, 2,..,T is observed. In structural dynamic models, W_t denotes the sequence of choice variables and observed state variables of an optimizing agent, while X_t* denotes the sequence of serially...</p>

We experimentally examine the impact of a cycle path on the trading of a copyable information good in networks. A cycle path in a network permits a buyer to become a reseller that can compete against existing sellers by replicating the good. Theory predicts that the price of the information...