This paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two-tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition. The merger of regions induces three e.ects on regional and local tax policies, which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically: i) an alleviation of tax competition at the...

In this paper, we analyze competition among jurisdictions to attract foreign capital through low taxes and public inputs that enhance firms' productivity. The competing jurisdictions are different in size and mobility of capital is costly. We find that for moderate mobility costs, small...

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country's economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely...

In this paper, we extend the concept of stability to vertical collusive agreements, involving downstream and upstream firms, using a setup of successive Cournot oligopolies. We show that a stable vertical agreement always exists: the unanimous vertical agreement involving all downstream and...

We study the impact of an offshore financial center on the economy in the presence or absence of bank secrecy in a two-country setting with heterogeneous investors who choose where to deposit their savings. Rather than focussing on tax competition, we acknowledge that countries use two...

This paper theoretically and empirically advances the hypothesis that differences in environmental preferences can be traced to cultural differences. In particular, we argue that environmental attitudes such as the willingness to pay for the environment are not solely the effect of local...

We analyse the effects of migration on the production of public goods, income taxes, and on the welfare of residents in the sending and in the receiving country. Migration is based on income differences between countries. Different alternative scenarios are considered. In the first, we assume...

This paper explains why and how a small country can be an offshore financial center (OFC). We build a model involving a small and a large country competing for portfolio investments. They use two instruments, taxation and institutional infrastructure. We identify the conditions for an OFC to be...

We analyze the effects of labor migration flows on income taxation between two countries (regions) differing by the size of their population and the level of productive efficiencies. Residents, otherwise identical, are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs. Each resident...