This note extends the characterization of simultaneous investment (tacit collusion) equilibria in Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux (2012). Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship...

Regulation (EC) No 1217/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of R&D agreements exempts horizontal R&D agreements from antitrust concerns when the combined market share of participants is low enough. We examine the...

We test the theoretical prediction that inter-firm spillovers must necessarily be large for the profit differential between cooperation and non-cooperation in R and D to be monotone increasing with them. By using the French data from the 2002 Community Innovation Survey, we find that spillovers...