The extant literature on trade credit emphasizes its financing role wherein financially sound firms provide trade credit to ease the credit constraints of weaker trading partners. We offer an alternative, though not mutually exclusive, perspective in which trade credit serves as a commitment...

We investigate the importance of board expertise by analyzing the role of “directors from related industries” (DRIs) on a firm's board. DRIs are officers and/or directors of companies in the upstream (supplier) or downstream (customer) industries of the firm. About 40% of firm-years in our...

We study how firms choose their debt maturity structure. We argue that because of lower information-gathering costs, institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with bonds outstanding across multiple maturities. We show that, in segmented markets, this preference for firms with bonds of...

This paper studies one of the potential causes of the financial market bubble of the late 1990s: herding behavior of mutual funds. We show that the incentives contained in the mutual funds' advisory contracts induce managers to overcome their tendency to herd. We argue that investing in bubble...

This paper employs the 2008 financial crisis as an empirical setting to examine how investment strategies of venture capitalists (VCs) vary in the presence of a liquidity supply shock, and what the performance implications of these strategies are for their portfolio startups. We show that while,...

We re-examine the impact of analyst coverage on firm innovation and find that the negative relation between analyst coverage and innovation is driven by firms that are poor-quality innovators. In contrast, analysts do not hinder innovation in firms that are efficient innovators. These findings...

We test the hypothesis that U.S. corporations headquartered in states with greater public corruption are also prone to more unethical behavior when operating abroad. We exploit passage of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) that curtailed bribery of foreign officials and find firms in corrupt...

This article studies one of the potential causes of the financial market bubble of the late 1990s: the herding behavior of mutual funds. We show that the incentives contained in the mutual funds' advisory contracts induce managers to overcome their tendency to herd. We argue that investing in...

We study whether firms tend to make the compensation of their managers dependent on the relative level of valuation. We consider compensation in the sample period between 1992 and 2003 and show that an increase in company valuation leads to an increase in the pay-for-performance sensitivity....

We study the trade-off between liquidity and monitoring implicit in the bank-firm relationship. By virtue of their lending activity, banks have privileged access to inside information about the companies and their monitoring role helps them mitigate the managers' risk-taking behavior. However,...