Bilateral monopoly, land assembly, and unanimous-consent Coasian bargaining present interesting strategic questions because they involve division of an economic surplus without competition to temper bargaining demands. We present a behavioral bargaining model in which payoff-maximizing proposers...

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Conventional wisdom as well as economic theory suggests it is more costly to reassemble fragmented land due to transactions costs and strategic bargaining costs. Both costs are expected to increase with the number of sellers. Inefficient allocation of land resources may result including property...

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This ‘‘holdout problem’’ is a common feature of the...

In a simple double-blind dictator experiment, systematically removing subjects’ levels of power and entitlement increases their choice of an income distribution generally consistent with Rawls (1971) concept of distributive justice, although choices are less unanimous and risk-averse than...

This paper develops and experimentally tests a model in which a player’s effort affects the probability of winning a contest in both the current and future periods. Theory predicts that rent-seeking effort will be shifted forward from later to earlier periods, with no change in overall...

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This “holdout problem” is a common feature of the land...