Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed' the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are...

We study the entry timing and location decisions of two exclusive buyer-supplier relationships in a continuous-time spatial competition model. In each relationship, the firms determine their entry timing and location, and negotiate a wholesale price through Nash bargaining. Then, the downstream...

This paper investigates on price competition in the Hotelling location model with linear transportation costs when consumer preferences are affected by the number of consumers shopping at the same store. A consumption externality permits to consider the imitation and the congestion effects which...

Hotelling’s famous ‘Principle of Minimum Differentiation’ suggests that two firms engaging in spatial competition will decide to locate at the same place. Interpreting spatial competition as modeling product differentiation, firms will thus offer products that are not differentiated and...

The economics literature generally considers products as points in some characteristics space. With more products being flexible or self-customizable to some degree, it makes sense to model products with positive measure. I develop a model of firms which can offer interval-long 'fat' products in...

This paper shows that Stackelberg has turned the Cournot competitors into monopolists, to result in Bertrand's equilibrium, and to fall into a prisoner's dilemma. This paper then applies Hotelling's theory to break the dilemma