whenever possible, thereby develop a theory of credible communication. Predictions confirm the longstanding intuition for …

higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. …

The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of … messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked … analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is …

type-coordination property: it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium when the players' types are … different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful …

example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication …

talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. …

previous "babbling" results. -- cheap talk ; communication ; coordination ; efficient equilibrium ; babbling …Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a …

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …