We study the e¤ect of competition on quality in markets such as health care, long-term care and education, when providers choose both prices and quality in a setting of spatial competition. We o¤er a novel mechanism whereby competition leads to lower quality. This mechanism relies on two key...

We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i.e., the payer may cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. The basic set up is a Hotelling model with two hospitals that differ in location and face demand uncertainty, where...

The English National Health Service (NHS) was established in 1948, and has therefore yielded some long time series data on health system performance. Waiting time for inpatient care have been a persistent policy concern since the creation of the NHS. After developing a simple theoretical...

Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently pased a new law on patients`right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a hotelling model with txo regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility leads to too low (higt) quality and two few (many)...

Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently passed a new law on patients' right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care financing and...

Many publicly funded health systems use prospective activity-based financing to increase hospital production and efficiency. The aim of this study is to investigate whether price changes for different treatments affect the mix of activity provided by hospitals. We exploit variations in prices...

Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently passed a new law on patients’right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care financing and...

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is veri?able (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...