The English National Health Service was established in 1948, and has therefore yielded some long time series data on health system performance. Waiting times for inpatient care have been a persistent cause of policy concern since the creation of the NHS. This paper develops a theoretical model...

<OL><LI>Waiting times for elective surgery are a significant health policy concern in approximately half of all OECD countries. The main objectives of the OECD Waiting Times project were to: <I>i)</I> review policy initiatives to reduce waiting times in 12 OECD countries; and <I>ii)</I> to investigate the causes of...</i></i></li></ol>

Waiting times for elective (non-urgent) surgery are a main health policy concern in approximately half of OECD countries. Mean waiting times for elective surgical procedures are above three months in several countries and maximum waiting times can stretch into years. They generate...

This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and two types of patients: high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals (competitive...

The English government has encouraged private providers – known as Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) – to treat publicly funded (NHS) patients. Providers are paid a fixed price per patient treated, adjusted to reflect geographical differences in input costs. But there may be other...

Waiting times are commonly used as a rationing device in health care and the public sector. We develop a stylised model, which predicts the dynamics of waiting times and waiting lists over time as a function of differing demand and supply parameters. We show that a path with decreasing waiting...

Policy-makers often claim that enhancing patient choice induces more competition among hospitals and may therefore reduce waiting times. This paper tests this claim using 120 English NHS hospitals over the period 1999-2001. Several proxies for the degree of choice (or competition) are...

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities), using a Hotelling framework, in the presence of sluggish demand. We take a differential game approach, and derive the open-loop solution (providers commit to an...

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities) taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (providers commit to an...

We model and compare the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services, such as a health authority, and a provider (the hospital) in three plausible scenarios: a) the purchaser sets the price, and activity is bargained between the purchaser and the provider: activity bargaining; b)...