Eco-labels emphasize information disclosure as a tool to induce environmentally friendly behaviors by both firms and consumers. The goal of eco-labels is to reduce information asymmetry between producers and consumers over the environmental attributes of a product or service. However, by...

Circular Economy Labels and Information Schemes (CELIS) compose the group of labels, certifications, standards of information schemes that fully or partially address one or more resource efficiency or circular economy elements. CELIS can play an important role in fostering circular economy...

This paper analyzes the reasons why countries may pursue different labeling policies in autarky and how this affects countries' welfare in the context of international trade. In an asymmetric information environment where producers know the quality of the goods they are selling and consumers are...

This paper analyzes the reasons why countries may pursue different labeling policies in autarky and how this affects countries' welfare in the context of international trade. In an asymmetric information environment where producers know the quality of the goods they are selling and consumers are...

In a market environment with random detection of product quality, a firm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality of one or both of its products. We characterize...

We study a firm's incentives to build and maintain reputation for quality, when quality is persistent and can be certified at a cost. We characterize all Markov-perfect equilibria where the firm's choices -i.e., timing of certification and investment– depend only on the firm's reputation. MPE...

We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality-dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observes the quality of the offered goods. Compared to the unregulated outcome, both profits and social welfare would...

This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2)...