In this paper, we focus on the adverse selection issue that prevails when the regulator is not able to observe the type of the abatement costs of the firms. The regulator decides the total level of emission that minimizes the expected social cost of pollution and she sells them to the firms. In...

Dans cet article nous construisons un système de contrôle des émissions polluantes qui combine permis d’émission et taxes sur la base du modèle de Roberts et Spence (1976). Nous relâchons l’hypothèse de linéarité de la fonction de transferts monétaires entre le régulateur et les...

In this paper, we focus on the adverse selection issue that prevails in an economy when the regulator is not able to observe the type of the abate- ment costs of the firms. The regulator decides the total level of emission that minimizes the total social cost and he sells them to the firms at...