Author: Edward J. Anderson, Pär Holmberg and Andrew B. Philpott Keywords: Pay-as-bid Auction; Divisible Good Auction; Mixed Strategy Equilibria; Wholesale Electricity Markets Pages: 71 Published: November 24, 2009 JEL-codes: D43; D44; C72 Download Wp814.pdf (756 kB) Abstract Using the concept of...

We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue...

This paper investigates the optimal bidding strategy (supply function) for a generator offering power into a wholesale electricity market. The model has three characteristics: the uncertainties facing the generator are described by a single probability function, namely the market distribution...

In this paper, we consider the optimal policy for a generator offering power into a wholesale electricity market operating under a pool arrangement. Anderson and Philpott [Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), pp. 82--100] recently discussed necessary conditions for an optimal offer curve when there is...

Generators in a wholesale electricity market can exercise market power, but the existence of forward hedging contracts between consumers and generators mitigates this market power. In our model we look at the role of the consumers (retailers here) in offering forward contracts. To deal with the...