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The goal of this paper is to illustrate the significance of information acquisition in mechanism design. We provide a stark example of a mechanism design problem in a collective choice environment with information acquisition. We concentrate on committees that are comprised of agents sharing a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224606
We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection. Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote on the project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability that good decisions are...
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A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative, or to continue costly search. Each alternative is described by a vector of distinct attributes, and each committee member can privately assess the quality of one attribute (her "speciality"). Preferences are...
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goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to … contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team …. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011541282
We report results from a laboratory experiment that explores the effects of preference communication and leader selection mechanisms in group decision-making. In a setting where all members of a group get the same payoff based on the group leader's decision of how much risk to take, we study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222348
We study the choice of a principal to either delegate a decision to a group of careerist experts, or to consult them individually and keep the decision-making power. Our model predicts a trade-off between information acquisition and information aggregation. On the one hand, the expected benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012549435