We study the delegation of climate policy to a supranational environmental authority. We demonstrate that the authority faces a dynamic inconsistency problem that leads to welfare losses. The losses can be kept small if the mandate of the authority penalizes the local cost of emissions heavily,...

We study the Ramsey (1928) model under the assumption that households act strategically. We compute the Markov perfect equilib- rium for this model and compare it to the original, competitive equi- librium and to a strategic open-loop equilibrium proposed by Sorger (2002, 2005b). We show that,...

We study Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE) of a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans economy in which households are aware of their influence on prices. The Ramsey conjecture fails to hold such that households other than the most patient one own positive wealth in the steady state. This confirms results...