When the repeated prisoner's dilemma setup is generalized to allow for a unilateral breakup, maximal efficiency in equilibrium remains an open question. With restrictions of simple symmetry with eternal mutual cooperation, defection, or (matched) alternation on the equilibrium path, we describe...

In a voluntary partnership prisoner's dilemma, equilibrium discounted payoff at the origin of a partnership also serves as the worst feasible threat with which to sustain cooperation. In a population model, we introduce the Markov strategy and characterize neutrally stable equilibrium. We...

Option to leave is a double-edged sword in the repeated prisoner's dilemma paradigm. We first show that too much breakup is not necessary in subgame perfect equilibrium distribution. We demonstrate on examples of well-known cooperation inducing solutions that, once an invasion with mixed...

The option to leave unilaterally serves as a double-edged sword for cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game, so that trigger strategies that use breakup as punishment threats generically may not yield optimally sustainable social outcome in this paradigm. In this study, we construct...

When the repeated prisoner's dilemma setup is generalized to allow for a unilateral breakup, maximal efficiency in equilibrium remains an open question. With restrictions of simple symmetry with eternal mutual cooperation, defection, or (matched) alternation on the equilibrium path, we describe...

When the repeated prisoner’s dilemma setup is generalized to allow for a unilateral breakup, maximal efficiency in equilibrium remains an open question. With restrictions of simple symmetry with eternal mutual cooperation, defection, or (matched) alternation on the equilibrium path, we...