without commitment. This policy features a state-contingent macroprudential debt tax that is strictly positive at date t if a …Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality: Agents do not … internalize how borrowing decisions taken in “good times” affect collateral prices during a crisis. We show that agents in a …

without commitment. This policy features a state-contingent macroprudential debt tax that is strictly positive at date t if a …Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality: Agents do not … internalize how borrowing decisions taken in "good times" affect collateral prices during a crisis. We show that agents in a …

without commitment. This policy features a state-contingent macroprudential debt tax that is strictly positive at date t if a …Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality: Agents do not … internalize how borrowing decisions taken in "good times" affect collateral prices during a crisis. We show that agents in a …

without commitment. This policy features a state-contingent macroprudential debt tax that is strictly positive at date t if a …Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality: Agents do not … internalize how borrowing decisions taken in "good times" affect collateral prices during a crisis. We show that agents in a …

amplification in response to domestic shocks or global spillovers and pecuniary externalities caused by Fisherian collateral …