Unlike studies that estimate managerial bias, we utilize a direct measure of managerial bias in the U.S. insurance industry to investigate the effects of executive compensation and corporate governance on firms' earnings management behaviors. We find managers receiving larger bonuses and stock...

This article applies a unique accruals measure to empirically test whether accruals quality affects the cost of capital for property-liability insurers. We utilize insurer loss reserve errors to accurately measure the quality of accruals. This measure, as well as conventional accruals measures,...

This paper investigates the possibility that managers of insurance firms have an incentive to manipulate accounting results in order to maximize their total compensation. Insurance company executives are in a relatively unique position in that they may be able to manipulate their total...

We examine the information value contained in insurer rating changes. Using a contemporary event study approach, we document an asymmetric reaction of stock prices to rating changes: downgrades cut share prices by approximately 7 percent but upgrades have little significant effect. This result...