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Synergistic Mergers in an Agency Context : An Illustration of the Interaction of the Observability Problem and Synergistic Merger

Campbell, Tim S.; Marino, Anthony M. - 2007

having the same agency problem. The merger creates synergy, but it also causes the principal to lose information in observing … that many of the beneficial effects that we would associate with the presence of synergy can be undone by the observability … essentially nonexistent and the merger is profitable. Second, if the post merger contract is very sensitive, then synergy is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051374

Sorting effects of performance pay

Goldmanis, Maris; Ray, Korok - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 61 (2015) 2, pp. 335-353

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490876

Adapting contract theory to fit contract farming

Wu, Steven Y. - In: American journal of agricultural economics 96 (2014) 5, pp. 1241-1256

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533130

Mediated audits

Pollrich, Martin - 2015

I study the optimal audit mechanism when the principal cannot commit to an audit strategy. Invoking a relevation principle, the agent reports her type to a mediator whi assigns contracts and recommends the principla whether to audit. For each reported type the mediator randomizes over a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285322

Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication

Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland - 2004 - Version 1.3, December 2004

This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361996

Designing contracts for the global fund : lessons from the theory of incentives

Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011460280

Principal-agent settings with random shocks

Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman M. - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 62 (2016) 4, pp. 985-999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011460525

Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation

Pollrich, Martin; Schmidt, Robert C. - 2014

A unilateral policy intervention by a country (such as the introduction of an emission price) can induce firms to relocate to other countries. We analyze a dynamic game where a regulator offers contracts to avert relocation of a firm in each of two periods. The firm can undertake a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010408009

Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents

Kusterer, David J. - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010431670

An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation : conference paper

Pollrich, Martin; Schmidt, Robert C. - 2014 - Preliminary and incomplete version

In a globalized economy, firms move production to other countries without turning a hair. A local policy maker who seeks to avert relocation faces a dynamic problem - incentivizing the firm to remain in its home country today does not guarantee that the firm also stays in the future. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482509