We analyze the treatment and impact of idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk in regulation. Regulatory authorities … all firms. This will lead to implicit discrimination. We combine models of firm-specific risk, liquidity management and … regularly ignore firm-specific characteristics, such as size or asset ages, implying different risk exposure in incentive …

We analyze the treatment and impact of idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk in regulation. Regulatory authorities … all firms. This will lead to implicit discrimination. We combine models of firm-specific risk, liquidity management and … regularly ignore firm-specific characteristics, such as size or asset ages, implying different risk exposure in incentive …

We analyze the treatment and impact of idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk in regulation. Regulatory authorities … all firms. This will lead to implicit discrimination. We combine models of firm-specific risk, liquidity management and … regularly ignore firm-specific characteristics, such as size or asset ages, implying different risk exposure in incentive …

The informationally simple approach to incentive regulation applies mechanisms that translate the regulator's objective …

To date, the distributive implications of incentive regulation on electricity transmission networks have not been … efficiency under price-cap regulation have not yet been identified. To discern these parameters is the motivation for the … price-cap incentive regulation for electricity transmission. We find that a regulator's use of ideal (Laspeyres) weights …

The informationally simple approach to incentive regulation applies mechanisms that translate the regulator’s objective …

In the context of yardstick regulation with long-lived assets, the influence of heterogeneous investment cycles on the …

In the context of yardstick regulation with long-lived assets, the influence of investment cycles and thereof resulting … problems of capital-recovery under an efficient firm standard yardstick regulation based on historic (straight …

subject to a lower powered regulation mechanism. The difference is particularly significant (about 7%) for firms in the upper …