mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i ….e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice … interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementability in unique …

-post implementation may not be possible. We propose direct (Bayesian) mechanisms that are robust to certain forms of bounded rationality … conditions for supermodular implementation in unique equilibrium. …

mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i ….e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice … interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementability in unique …

design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded … rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic … supermodular mechanism whose equilibria are contained in the smallest interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This is followed …

mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i ….e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice … interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementability in unique …

information is subject to multiplier effects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive … dissemination of public information is thus considerably lower than the static case suggests. If the social learning signal is …

information is subject to multipliereffects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a … dissemination of public information is thus considerably lower than the static case suggests. If the social learning signal is …

We address the problem of learning and implementation on the Internet. When agents play repeated games in distributed … the essential properties that constitute ``reasonable'' learning behavior in distributed environments. We then study the … context. Finally, we discuss implementation of social choice functions with these solution concepts. …

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are … this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions …