Showing 71 - 80 of 285
Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from that in equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions; hence there is, at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681772
Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects' risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions: (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010684334
Managers often use tournaments which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the bottom, or both. In this paper we compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the corresponding incentive schemes. To do so, we utilize optimal contracts in a principal-agent setting, using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010633550
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010155758
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010033968
We investigate determinants of price expectations and satisfaction levels of financial professionals and students. In experiments with 150 professionals and 576 students, we systematically vary price paths according to the final return (positive or negative) and the way the final return is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012897819
The efficiency of financial markets, but also their potential to produce bubbles are central topics in academic and professional debates. Yet, little is known about the contribution of financial professionals to price efficiency. We run 116 experimental markets with 412 professionals and 502...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899797
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013284096
Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110864
Tournaments are widely used in organizations, explicitly or implicitly, to reward the best-performing employees, e.g., through promotion or bonuses, and to punish the worst-performing employees, e.g., through firing or unfavorable job assignments. We use a principal-agent model to compare the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742082