This paper describes private actors' involvement in Colombia's policymaking process. While more transparent and formal …, follows a faster track and depends more on political power than on those policies' potential as engines for productivity … different groups' weight in policymaking, and the effect of the implied unbalance on aggregate productivity. Electoral weight …

This paper describes private actors' involvement in Colombia's policymaking process. While more transparent and formal …, follows a faster track and depends more on political power than on those policies' potential as engines for productivity … different groups' weight in policymaking, and the effect of the implied unbalance on aggregate productivity. Electoral weight …

This paper describes private actors' involvement in Colombia's policymaking process. While more transparent and formal …, follows a faster track and depends more on political power than on those policies' potential as engines for productivity … different groups' weight in policymaking, and the effect of the implied unbalance on aggregate productivity. Electoral weight …

This paper describes private actors’ involvement in Colombia’s policymaking process. While more transparent and formal …, follows a faster track and depends more on political power than on those policies’ potential as engines for productivity … different groups’ weight in policymaking, and the effect of the implied unbalance on aggregate productivity. Electoral weight …

This paper describes private actors’ involvement in Colombia’s policy-making process. While more transparent and formal …, follows a faster track and depends more on political power than on those policies’ potential as engines for productivity … different groups’ weight in policy-making, and the effect of the implied unbalance on aggregate productivity. Electoral weight …

Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry …. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where … analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in the U.S. over …

from 1984-2004. Our theory also predicts that special interest groups will mainly target lop-sided winners whereas general …

lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect … behalf. Our analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in … legislating, we are able to explain why the share of commercial lobbyist activity in total lobbying has risen dramatically and now …

Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry …. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where … analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in the U.S. over …