countries, allowing for transfers. We employ a two-stage, non-cooperative model of coalition formation. In the first stage each … simultaneously. Coalition members agree also to share the gains from cooperation in the first stage. We use quadratic benefit and … examining the impact of transfers on the coalition size, we apply the notion of Potential Internal Stability (PIS). Results show …

games with continuous strategy space -- 13. Coalition models : a first approach -- 14. Coalition models : a second approach … -- 15. Coalition models : a third approach -- 16. Summary and conclusions …

issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the … critical role over the outcome of the coalition formation game. …

on others' abatement. I show that a full or majority coalition can be stable. This requires, however, that a majority of … countries have relatively strong reciprocity preferences. No coalition participation is always stable. In addition, a stable … minority coalition may exist; if so, it is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is …