This article analyses the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender-receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose...

What is a rational decision-maker supposed to do when facing an unfamiliar problem, where there is uncertainty but no basis for making probabilistic assessments? One answer is to use a form of expected utility theory, and assume that agents assign their own subjective probabilities to each...

This paper examines experimentally the reputation building role of disclosure in an investment/trust game. It provides experimental evidence in support of sequential equilibrium behavior in a finitely repeated investment/trust game where information asymmetry raises the possibility of voluntary...

This paper examines experimentally the reputation building role of disclosure in an investment / trust game. It provides experimental evidence in support of sequential equilibrium behavior in a finitely repeated investment / trust game where information asymmetry raises the possibility of...