We develop a demand system for a dynamic auction market with directed search. In each period, heterogeneous goods are exogenously supplied and sold by second price auction, and incumbent bidders choose which good to bid on and how much to bid. Bidder valuations are multidimensional, private and...

We develop a model of consumer search with spatial learning in which sampling the payoff of one product causes consumers to update their beliefs about the payoffs of other products that are nearby in attribute space. Spatial learning gives rise to path dependence, as each new search decision...

We consider non-parametric estimation and inference of conditional moment models in high dimensions. We show that even when the dimension D of the conditioning variable is larger than the sample size n, estimation and inference is feasible as long as the distribution of the conditioning variable...

We develop a decentralized Bayesian model of college admissions with two ranked colleges, heterogeneous students and two realistic match frictions: students find it costly to apply to college, and college evaluations of their applications is uncertain. Students thus face a portfolio choice...

Since Akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. The remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. Part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private...

Firms have ever increasing access to consumer data, which they use to personalize their advertising and to price discriminate. This raises privacy concerns. Policymakers have argued in response that consumers should be given control over their data, able to choose what to share and when. Since...

In public sector procurement, social welfare often depends on the time taken to complete the contract. A leading example is highway construction, where slow completion times inflict a negative externality on commuters. Recently, highway departments have introduced innovative contracting methods...

Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can "buy-it-now" at a posted price, or...

Since Akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. The remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. Part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private...

Increasingly sophisticated tracking technology oers publishers the ability to oer targeted advertisements to advertisers. Such targeting enhances advertising efficiency by improving the match quality between advertisers and users, but also thins the market of interested advertisers. Using...