I study how a matching platform's design affects users' welfare and probability of matching (outcomes) and the strategic decisions behind such a design. I consider a two-sided matching model in which each agent has a limited number of prospects. An increase in agents' number of prospects has two...

How does group identity affect belief formation? To address this question, we conduct a series of online experiments with a representative sample of individuals in the US. Using the setting of the 2020 US presidential election, we find evidence of intergroup preference across three distinct...

How does group identity affect belief formation? To address this question, we conduct a series of online experiments with a representative sample of individuals in the US. Using the setting of the 2020 US presidential election, we find evidence of intergroup preference across three distinct...

This paper studies housing markets in the presence of constraints on the number of agents involved in exchanges. We search for mechanisms satisfying effective endowments-swapping proofness, which requires that no pair of agents can gain by “individually rational” swapping their endowments...

We introduce a solution concept for dynamic one-sided matching models, called the Dynamic Core. The Dynamic Core is defined for a general class of dynamic markets where agents and objects arrive over time, and objects can be privately or collectively owned. We prove that the Dynamic Core is not...

The Coase Theorem predicts that, if there are no transaction costs, parties will always contract their way to an efficient outcome. Thus, no matter which legal rules society chooses, "Coasean bargains" will lead to efficient results. There are always some transaction costs. However, transaction...

Stable mechanisms are not immune to manipulation in matching markets; however, they work well in practice. We study the college admission problem where colleges have completely heterogeneous preferences and can under-report their capacities. Assuming there is a continuum of students, we use a...

We study a matching model with salaries in which firms face budget constraints. Due to budget constraints, the existence of a stable matching is not guaranteed. We show that if workers are homogeneous, from the firms' point of view, then a weak stable matching always exists; furthermore, when a...

I model access to influence as a two-sided matching market between a continuum of experts and a finite number of gatekeepers under sequential directed search. Real-world examples include academic publishing, venture capitalism or political agenda setting. Uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium...

This paper considers a new axiom of a choice function called equal treatment of individuals in an indifference class (ETI) in the context of matching problems. We show that when a choice function satisfies ETI and two commonly-used axioms, substitutability and size monotonicity, any individual...