Divided enrollment systems cause school assignments to be unfair and wasteful. Iterative version of the student-optimal stable mechanism (I-SOSM), proposed by Manjunath and Turhan (2016), achieves individually rational and fair assignments in such partitioned school choice markets for any number...

We study mechanism design in dynamic nonmonetary markets where objects are allocated to unit-demand agents with private types and quasi-linear payoffs in their waiting costs. We consider a general class of mechanisms that determine the joint distribution of the object assigned to each agent and...

We consider a stable improvement problem in a controlled school choice model which covers those of several previous studies. First, we consider the case where the priority for each school is a weak order. We derive a sufficient condition for a stable matching to be constrained efficient. It is...

Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic...

As a random allocation rule for indivisible object allocation problems under weak priorities, deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking (DA-STB) is not ex-post constrained efficient. We first observe that it also fails to satisfy a natural fairness notion, symmetry at the top, which requires...

I investigate three goals of school choice: student welfare, encouraging neighborhood schools, and diversity. I develop a framework for finding the optimal match for any combination of these objectives while respecting stability and incentive compatibility. I then apply my framework to data from...

We study airport slot allocation problems during weather-induced congestion. These real-life matching problems are important to airlines as the costs of delays are significant compared to their profits. We introduce a new mechanism, Multiple Trading Cycles (MTC), to allocate landing slots. In...

We study a dynamic two-sided many-to-one matching model that generalizes the college admissions problem. A dynamically stable matching does not generally exist. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching and show that some but not all results for the...