For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposal, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses...

Popularity bias -- the tendency to make choices that are more popular -- is a widespread behavior. We incorporate this bias into a dynamic model of a bipartite economy with heterogeneous agents, where each agent primarily cares about obtaining her optimal number of partners. We provide a full...

The large markets model with a continuum of agents has been a major methodological innovation for studying real-life assignment problems. In this paper I study the following question: if we sample random finite economies from a continuum economy, will the Deferred Acceptance (DA) assignment of...

We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In such markets, we establish the efficiency of...

Many two-sided marketplaces rely on match recommendations to help customers find suitable service providers at suitable prices. (Examples include Angi, HomeAdvisor, Thumbtack and To8to.) This paper develops a tractable methodology that a platform can use to optimize its match recommendation...

Public school choice often yields student placements that are neither fair nor efficient. Kesten (2010) proposed an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (EADAM) that allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignment. In this article, we provide...

We introduce a new notion of ex-post efficiency for random assignment problems, namely ex-post rank efficiency that gives a maximal number of agents their favored objects. An ex-post rank efficient random assignment is a lottery over rank efficient deterministic assignments, in the sense of...

Pathak and Sönmez (2013) provided support for many real-world school choice reforms by showing that the post-reform mechanisms are often “less manipulable” than the pre-reform mechanisms according to their criterion of manipulability. In many realistic preference domains including...

Since 1950, India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the world. Vertical reservations are provided to members of historically discriminated Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBC). Horizontal reservations are provided...