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Monkey see, monkey do: Truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others
Guillen, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - Abteilung "Verhalten auf Märkten", … - 2014
. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010955345
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Monkey see, monkey do: Truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others
Guillen, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2014
. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335854
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Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267
-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986
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The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kesten, Onur - 2014
A particular adaptation of Gale's top trading cycles procedure to school choice, the so-called TTC mechanism, has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of Gale's original...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429798
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Transparency and fairness in school choice mechanisms
Hermstrüwer, Yoan - 2019
assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012041733
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Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
Fragiadakis, Daniel; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 863-908
requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts … properties. We expect the use of our mechanisms to improve the performance of matching markets with distributional constraints in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705212
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Constrained School Choice
Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823987
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Constrained School Choice
Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129
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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects incentives are drastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547189
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Constrained school choice: An experimental study
Haeringer, Guillaume; Calsamiglia, Caterina; Klijn, Flip - 2009
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279488