We find a U-shaped relation between industry concentration and innovation. The relation is driven by neck-and-neck industries where firms operate with similar productivity. When industry concentration is low, innovation intensity decreases as concentration increases. However, when industry...

We revisit an endogenous timing game with consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay (WTP). Previous studies have shown that when firms compete in quantity, a simultaneous moving outcome (leader-leader) must be presented in equilibrium. In contrast to this result, we find that...

The impact of product variety on welfare has received little attention in the electronic commerce literature. The problem with product variety is that more variety does not necessarily imply higher welfare. This paper finds the conditions under which more variety, if caused by lower fixed costs,...

Scholars and antitrust enforcers have raised concerns about anticompetitive effects that may arise when institutional investors hold substantial stakes in competing firms. Their concern rests on empirical evidence that such common concentrated ownership is associated with higher prices and lower...

I derive the objective function of a firm with heterogeneous shareholders. In contrast to Fisher separation theorem, I drop the price-taking assumption. Therefore, shareholders have no unanimous preferences for profit maximization. I allow shareholders to act strategically by omitting the...

Some scholars have argued that the phenomenon known as common ownership, which refers to an investor's simultaneous ownership of small stockholdings in several competing companies, is anticompetitive and prohibited by the U.S. antitrust laws. These proponents target in particular large...

A bundled discount occurs when a seller charges less for a bundle of goods than for its components when sold separately. A characteristic of such discounting is that a rival who makes only one of the products in the bundle may have to give a larger per item discount in order to compensate the...

Partial ownership of stock in multiple competing firms is an important scholarly and policy topic in both corporate and antitrust law. Until now, the discussion has focused on ownership. This essay shifts the debate from a focus on common ownership to a focus on common control. No prior work has...

A phenomenon known as “Common Ownership” arises when shareholders hold substantial stakes in competing firms. Although recent empirical evidence has illustrated how common concentrated owners are associated with higher product market prices and lower output, scholars remain divided as to the...

This paper presents a model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. If entry occurs, then competition proceeds through Cournot quantity competition. My model, like those of (e.g.) Dixit and Ware, includes a strategic use for capacity prior to entry. However, it differs in that I consider a...