Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts...

Sequential search problems such as secretary problems can be extended to a natural zero-sum two-player game where the Decision Maker faces an opponent with a similar move set. This paper analyzes the game for a sequential search problem known as the Cayley-Moser problem, which falls under the...

In this paper, we present a general model in which mutually dependent negotiations are simultaneously conducted and define a solution concept for the model. We provide a sufficient condition for the solution to exist and show that the solutions approximately coincide with the equilibrium...

In the spirit of theoretical pluralism, this chapter critically illustrates an alternative game theoretic approach that extends the Nash equilibrium criterion. It is assumed that players believe in the empathic ability to anticipate other players' simultaneous and future reactions to their...

I study the effects of improved public information on equilibrium welfare and price dispersion, providing sufficient conditions for negative and positive effects. Public information affects welfare by reducing excessive (though rational) pessimism induced by sequential learning. Reduced...

It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as...

We study how group size affects cooperation in an infinitely repeated n-player Prisoner`s Dilemma (PD) game. In each repetition of the game, groups of size n ≤ M are randomly and anonymously matched from a fixed population of size M to play the n-player PD stage game. We provide conditions...

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...

We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions...

This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.