In this paper, we present a general model in which mutually dependent negotiations are simultaneously conducted and define a solution concept for the model. We provide a sufficient condition for the solution to exist and show that the solutions approximately coincide with the equilibrium...

Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts...

Commentators have explored the Supreme Court's certiorari process in detail, examining the practice through doctrinal, historical, empirical, and even economic lenses. Similarly, a few commentators have attempted to analyze the relationship between the Supreme Court and the lower courts using...

In the spirit of theoretical pluralism, this chapter critically illustrates an alternative game theoretic approach that extends the Nash equilibrium criterion. It is assumed that players believe in the empathic ability to anticipate other players' simultaneous and future reactions to their...

In this paper the author analyzes the nature of the legislative process which takes place within the European Parliament by studying the bilateral interactions among its relevant decisional groups, i.e. the parliamentary groups. In this sense, the author uses a methodological approach inspired...

We introduce the novel concept of a three-dimensional payoff matrix based on a simplified version of a card game. This matrix is necessary to represent the three variables which correspond to the dynamics of the game. We find Sonnaville-Mensink Equilibria (SME) that represent the optimal actions...

At each moment in time, some alternative from a finite set is selected by a dynamic process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes-vote is decisive for the alternative in question, the alternative is accepted and...

Starting with a simple economic model of the value of civil litigation from each side's perspective, this paper analyses a wide range of potential litigation cost strategies, settlement offers and negotiations, together with relevant applications and insights from game theory. Specific issues...

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...

Sequential search problems such as secretary problems can be extended to a natural zero-sum two-player game where the Decision Maker faces an opponent with a similar move set. This paper analyzes the game for a sequential search problem known as the Cayley-Moser problem, which falls under the...