We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and "middle of the road" voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast to...

We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and "middle of the road" voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast to...

We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and ‘middle of the road’ voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast...

This paper shows how provision of public goods differ in the context of centralisation and decentralisation when the incumbent politician confers the responsibility of the actual provision to a bureaucrat who extracts bribe from the public and provides a predetermined portion of it to the...

The reason why the social contract is so different in two otherwise comparable societies like the United States and continental Western European countries represents a challenging question. Large empirical evidence shows that the difference in the political support for redistribution appears to...

This paper introduces a concern for model misspecification in a Lucas-Stokey optimal fiscal policy setting. The representative household in this economy is endowed with the knowledge of a reference model for the government spending process but acknowledges that this model is potentially...

Why do lawyers in some jurisdictions continue to ‘automatically’ exclude the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in their choices of law for international sales contracts? Why do lawyers in other jurisdictions approach the decision very differently? Why...

To accurately quantify the effects of government spending, it is necessary to identify exogenous changes in government spending. In this paper, we estimate a proxy VAR, developed by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013), using a revised supplementary budget from the government as...

We study identification of preferences in static single-agent discrete choice models where decision makers may be imperfectly informed about the state of the world. We leverage the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium by Bergemann and Morris (2016) to provide a tractable...