The first part of this paper develops a theoretical model of fiscal equalisation to derive an optimal equalisation formula that has general applicability for federations. If vertical equity is achieved by the central government and horizontal equity by interstate migration, the...

An unfunded expenditure mandate occurs when a local government must provide a good or service by dictate of a higher level of government that does not supply an accompanying revenue source to fully finance the expenditure. This paper is the first to provide empirical evidence on the influence of...

We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...

In this paper, we model a federal economy where perfectly mobile labour supply is taxed on an ad valorem basis by the federal as well as lower-level (state) governments. We find that either under- or overtaxation occurs, under similar conditions as in Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004). However,...

This paper provides a simple political agency model to explain the effect of political alignment between different tiers of government on intergovernmental grants and election outcomes. Key features of the model are: (i) rational voters interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent...

The traditional normative literature on fiscal federalism argues that redistributive policies should be centralized in order to avoid welfare- or tax-induced migration. However, recent evidence shows that even in a setup where the progressivity of the income tax schedule is centralized to an...

This paper uses a simple model of fiscal competition between local jurisdictions to analyse the impact of intergovernmental grants on the composition of public spending. We find that a higher degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalisation coincides with a smaller overall share...

We study tax evasion and decentralized tax enforcement in a federal economy with mobile capital and the endogenous formation of multiregional companies. Regions use their enforcement policy as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. Within this framework, we analyze the...

Recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditions under which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. A system of...