I include a role for time preferences within a version of the Young (J. Econ. Theory 59:145-168, 1993b) evolutionary model of bargaining. With or without time preferences, the stochastic stable convention yields a generalized version of the Nash (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) Bargaining...

By providing incentives for sellers to act in a trustworthy manner, reputation mechanisms in many online environments can mitigate moral-hazard problems when particular buyers and sellers interact infrequently. However, these mechanisms rely on buyers sharing their private information about...

Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context to similar realizations of past play are presented. The models are implemented in a cognitive framework, ACT-R, and vary in how they implement similarity-based categorization...

We propose an extension to smooth fictitious play and prove that play converges to an ε-Markov perfect equilibrium with probability one in a class of stochastic games known as Markov potential games. We then prove a partial Folk theorem for repeated games under one-period perfect monitoring. We...

We allow buyers to choose the timing of offers in a dynamic adverse selection model with a single seller. Buyers have private information and can delay their one-time private offers to learn from other buyers by observing trading behavior. We find that the equilibrium exhibits maximum delay in...

We study continuous time oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices or quantities. We study a deterministic version of the problem using an asymptotic expansion of the relevant HJB partial differential equations. We find in...