In this study we focus on differences in careers and wage development between white-collar workers. We are interested in the questions of which factors contribute to these differences and at what stage of the career they occur. Furthermore, we investigate the wage effects of the different types...

Two critical aspects of the model of auditor expertise development in Tan and Libby [1997] are that audit firms do not value tacit knowledge in inexperienced auditors but do value it in experienced auditors. We update the former and extend the latter. Our paper predicts and finds that audit...

In this paper, I analyse the relationship between job-related training and career progress of workers. Most theories of career paths and task assignment rely on human capital accumulation. Therefore, it seems natural to start assessing the empirical validity of such theories by analysing the...

Two critical aspects of Tan and Libby [1997]’s model of auditor expertise development are that audit firms do not value tacit knowledge in inexperienced auditors but do value it in experienced auditors. We update the former and extend the latter. Our paper predicts and finds that audit firms...

We estimate of the determinants of performance appraisal, profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes for a representative sample of German establishments. The results demonstrate that foreign owned establishments make more use of each of these HRM practices than domestically owned...

In this paper, I analyse the relationship between job-related training and career progress of workers. Most theories of career paths and task assignment rely on human capital accumulation. Therefore, it seems natural to start assessing the empirical validity of such theories by analysing the...

Theory predicts that the wage effects of government-mandated severance payments depend on workers' and firms' relative bargaining power. This paper estimates the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on workers' individual wages in a quasi-experimental setting, exploiting a reform...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...