We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium. …

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … form costly undirected links anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent network bargaining. Assuming … are not even singularly pairwise stable. As an important implication, this reveals the diversity of possible bargaining …

and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely …

applications to legislative bargaining and international trade negotiations …

It is well-known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are …

Two parties bargaining over a pie whose size is determined by the investment decisions of both. The bargaining rule is … sensitive to the investment behavior. If a symmetric investments pro le is observed, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash … Demand Game; otherwise bargaining proceeds according to the Ultimatum Game. We are interested in the evolutionary emergence …

function can be explained by Nash bargaining between workers and employers. Under fairly mild assumptions, Nash bargaining … exceed the wage reward. This paper reviews the established empirical regularities and then provides Nash bargaining results …

I study the limit rule for bilateral bargaining when agents recognize that the aggregate economy (influencing the match … derived in this paper is of special importance for decentralized exchange economies with bargaining. Two simple applications … are presented to illustrate this fact. The first example is a model of wage bargaining and trade externalities. I show …