firms. The working hypothesis is that further economic integration would bring competition into electricity markets …

We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new …

entry. That is, we do not need to resort to learning, weak property rights or exogenous costs of entry to generate this …

I generalize the workhorse model of network competition (Armstrong, 1998; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a,b) to include … workhorse model of network competition … stylized facts: The networks have an incentive to agree on high mobile termination rates to soften competition. They charge a …

We develop a model of competition between interconnected networks, with separate local and long-distance markets …, allowing for various degrees of symmetry between carriers. Assuming two part pricing, we show that effective competition can be … interconnected local networks want to agree on cost based interconnection charges, but that through competition for local market …

(off-net) networks is shown to restore competition. This regulation requires neither demand data nor information about call …We analyse competition between perfectly substitutable networks. Monopolization can be sustained in equilibrium by … asymmetric access prices whereby entry is deterred by a set of margin squeezes. A regulatory package consisting of (i) mandatory …

We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC … transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive … transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network's customer base …

network (e.g., an interexchange carrier (IXC)) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with … both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that … network's customer base …