Showing 131 - 140 of 232
This paper considers a class of repeated signalling games to gain some intuitive insights into the effects and the desirability of modelling players in a dynamic game of incomplete information as being obstinate in the sense that their beliefs satisfy a support restriction. We demonstrate that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004993123
The paper analyzes the canonical hold-up model of Hart and Moore (1988) under the assumption that the courts can verify delivery of the good by the seller. We show that the first best can be achieved using simple "option contracts" which give the seller the right to decide whether or not trade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028234
We examine the evolutionary foundations of common equilibrium refinement ideas for extensive form games, such as backward and forward induction, by examining the limiting outcome of an evolutionary process driven by stochastic learning and (rare) mutations. We show that the limiting outcome in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028471
This paper analyses the investment incentives given by contingent ownership structures that are prevalent in joint ventures. We consider a variation of the standard hold-up problem where two parties make relationship-specific investments sequentially in order to generate a joint surplus in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708480
This paper introduces a class of signalling games with response intersection to discuss the informational efficiency of a monopolistic financial market. For these games a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fully revealing sequential equilibrium outcomes is derived....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032189
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231909
We study market breakdown in a finance context under extreme adverse selection with and without competitive pricing. Adverse selection is extreme if for any price there are informed agent types with whom uninformed agents prefer not to trade. Market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153439
We embed a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility, a marriage market, into a random search model. We study steadystate equilibria and characterize the limit of the corresponding equilibrium matchings as exogenous search frictions become small. The central question is whether the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010562452