We examine the gift exchange hypothesis on both the quantity and quality of output using a hybrid field-laboratory labor market experiment. We recruited participants to enter survey data for a well-known charitable organization. Workers were paid either a high or low wage. We find that although...

Based on a unique time-use survey of academic researchers in Japan, this study finds that research time decreases over the life cycle. The decrease in total hours worked and the increase in time spent on administrative tasks explain the decrease in research time. We also show that the decrease...

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirableactivity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability?When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction?This paper shows that any restriction of implementabilityis caused by an identification...

The paper examines the determinants of the division of labor within firms. It provides an explanation of the pervasive observed changes in work organization away from the traditional functional departments and towards multi-tasking and job rotation. Whereas the existing literature on the...

To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a job search model with endogenous job search effort by the unemployed along various search channels that deals with this. The...

This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise determine an agency's total surplus within an linear agency framework with multiple tasks. It provides a decomposition of agency costs, leading back to a congruity index previously proposed in the literature. In addition, it...

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring...