cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails disagreement with high probability. In the unique pair of pure strategy … unattainable. A strongly asymmetric authority relationship is thus the only viable alternative to costly conamp;#64258;ict …

cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails disagreement with high probability. In the unique pair of pure strategy … unattainable. A strongly asymmetric authority relationship is thus the only viable alternative to costly conflict. …

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is … the Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem and the Maximum Theorem implies convergence to the Nash … bargaining solution when time between proposals vanishes. The model unifies alternating offers, one-sided offers and random …

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary … vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard …

We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set …

bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but … attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …

We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set …

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary … vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard …

-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …