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Schipper, Burkhard - 2014

We study the correlation of choice under risk in Holt-Laury lotteries for gains and losses with gender, the use of … the digit ratio (2D:4D) in more than 200 subjects. In males, salivary testosterone is negatively correlated with risk … aversion for gains only. In females, salivary cortisol is positively correlated with risk aversion for gains only. No other …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010255048

Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions

Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin; Strauß, Sabine - 2007

We examine bidding behaviour of individuals and teams in an experimental auction resembling UMTS-license auctions. Even though in reality teams were largely involved in those auctions, experimental studies on bidding in auctions have so far relied on individual bidders. Our results show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293394

Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence

Damianov, Damian S.; Oechssler, Jörg; Becker, Johannes Gerd - 2007

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422172

Going Once, Going Twice, Reported!

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2009

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniencyprogram). In EN,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325640

Collusion and the Choice of Auction: An Experimental Study

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2010

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325969

Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets

Neugebauer, Tibor; Selten, Reinhard - 2002

feedback. In earlier experimental work an overbidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium has been frequently reported. Our … data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263057

Less fighting than expected: experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions

Hoerisch, Hannah; Kirchkamp, Oliver - 2007

-price all-pay auctions. Many other studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions. We can replicate this property. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263871

Out-of equilibrium bids in auctions: wrong expectations or wrong bids

Kirchkamp, Oliver; Reiss, J. Philipp - 2008

Deviations from equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies (see Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) or correct expectations but small (perhaps quantal-response) mistakes in best replies (see Goeree et al., 2002). To distinguish...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263873

Divisible-good uniform price auctions: The role of allocation rules and communication among bidders

Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - 2009

We use laboratory experiments to compare allocation rules in uniform price divisible good auctions. 'Standard' and 'uniform' allocation rules admit different types of low-price equilibria, which are eliminated by a 'hybrid' rule. We observe little evidence of revenue differences among the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277504

Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - 2010

Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281671