We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction is repeated and bidders are patient enough. We find that the …

We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first …

; menstrual cycle ; gender ; likelihood of conception ; first price auction ; risk behavior ; competition ; bidding …

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after … discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform … price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller …

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and … the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and …